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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant refers the Court to the Statements 
contained in his Brief and in the respondent's Brief. 
Appellant acknowledges that the factual matters concerning 
his divorce in the Navajo Tribal Court were not before 
Judge Bunnell. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Xhe District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over an action for child support between enrolled 
members of the Navajo Tribe, one of whom is domiciled 
on the Navajo Reservation, as a matter of Federal law. 
2. The District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over a 
Navajo resident of the Navajo Reservation who has no 
significant contacts with the State of Utah, as a 
matter of Federal law. 
ARGUMENT 
1* THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION FOR CHILD 
SUPPORT BETWEEN ENROLLED MEMBERS OF THE 
NAVAJO TRIBE OF WHOM ONE IS DOMICILED 
ON THE NAVAJO RESERVATION. 
Respondent's argument on the issue of subject 
matter 1urisdiction can fairly be clarified and summarized 
and tribal sovereignty infringement, as developed in 
Williams v. Lee (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed. 
2d 251. As to the first method, the receipt of A.F.D.C. 
benefits by the appellant's children upon the application 
of their mother is, for some unexpounded reason, substantial 
and significant contact on the part of appellant with Utah. 
As to the second method, because the New Mexico Supreme 
Court long ago suggested in Natewa v. Natewa (1972), N.M., 
499 P.2d 691, and State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson (1973) ,^  
N.M. 506 P.2d 786, that enforcement of a child support obli-
gation cannot infringe upon tribal sovereignty, respondent 
believes the Utah Supreme Court is at liberty .to uncriticalj 
follow the New Mexico court and, without further analysis, 
find no infringement here. Thus, according to respondent 
the District Court's ruljlng may be upheld after either 
analysis is performed. | 
Respondent's argument is simplistic and untenable 
numerous reasons. First, respondent has failed to consider 
the effect of preemption, as developed in McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Commissioner (1973), 411 U.S. 164, 93 
S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129, on the District Court's juris-
dlrMon. Second, respondent dopR not consider that the 
never analyzes nor states why the District Court's jurisdic-
tional assertion creates no infringement upon tribal 
sovereignty. And infringement jtjs found h6re. Fourth, re-
spondent does not understand that the significant contacts 
exception has never, by itself, been appropriate grounds for 
jurisdiction where sovereignty infringement is found. Fifth, 
respondent's assertion, that the receipt of benefits by 
appellant's children is a substantial and significant contact 
by appellant with Utah,confuses the obligation of support 
with the mere receipt of benefits, and such benefits do not, 
in fact, create a significant contact between appellant and 
Utah. Each of these faults is considered in turn. 
l 
a. The State of Utah is preempted from 
extending its civil authority over 
the controversy at issue. 
In State Securities Inc. V. Anderson (supra), 506 
P.2d 786, the New Mexico court rejected an argument that a 
federal regulation,vesting original jurisdiction in tribal 
courts over civil actions where the defendant is an Indian 
and found within their territorial jurisdiction, and a pro-
vision of the New Mexico Constitution disclaiming any right 
over Indian lands, acted to preempt New Mexico's jurisdiction 
the federal regulations establishing the narrow procedures 
for such an extension (ie., 25 U.S.C. sections 1322, 1324, ] 
and 1326) . Jji. , at p.793. 
The dissenters were subsequently vindicated by thl 
l 
decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (197J 
1 
I 
411 U.S. 164, when the United States Supreme Court said thai 
f,
...the trend has been away from the idea of inherent India! 
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward re- 1 
liance on federal preempt ion.,f, as is found by an examinatij 
of n...the applicable treaties and statutes which define thl 
limits of state power." (411 U.S. at p.172.), and struck 1 
down an extension of Arizona civil authority (an income tan 
on Navajos) not made in compliance with 25 U.S.C. sectional 
1322, 1324 and 1326. The New Mexico Supreme Court has sincl 
acknowledged this change, and significantly undermined the! 
continuing viability of the State Securities decision, by lj 
decision in Chino v. Chino (1977), N.M., 561 P.2d 476. J 
In Chino, the New Mexico Court noted "...recent 1 
cases shift the focus of analysis to the relevant treatieaB 
1 
and statutes governing the tribes, and whether or not theym 
would preempt state jur isdic t ion. " I_d. at p.478. The 3 
1 
n n a n -f mon q C r m r f f h p n c o n r l u d p d thnt R t a t p 1 i t r 1 <?H "f r 11 on ov<*r* 
law, Jtd.. , at p.479. This conclusion provided an indepen-
dent basis for upholding a lower court dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
The purpose of this exposition is to show that 
federal and state courts, including New Mexico, rely upon 
preemption analysis as an initial step in examining cases 
involving Indian controversies, and, where preemption is 
found, it stands as an independent ground for barring the 
asserted jurisdiction of a state court. 
In his Brief, appellant established that Utah 
disclaimed jurisdiction over reservation lands within its 
borders and has taken no legally sufficient affirmative 
steps to extend its civil jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions. (Appellant's Brief, p.p. 17-19.) Utah is therefore 
preempted from any assertion of its civil authority over 
persons or matters within these reservations. Respondent 
has not argued against this conclusion, and appellant 
assumes that if this case is shown to involve an impermis-
sible extension of Utah's civil authority, respondent would 
concur that this case must be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction on that basis alone. 
Respondent has noted the paucity of factual 
basis of preemption in this case. 
The following facts are known: first, appellant 
was a domiciliary of the Navajo Reservation and an enrolled 
member of the Navajo Tribe at the time the A.F.D.C assistanc 
was applied for and paid; second, the A.F.D.C. assistance wa 
applied for by Helen Vijil for the support of appellant's 
children, who are also enrolled members of the Navajo Trlbet 
Respondent states that it cannot be determined from the recO 
whether the children and Helen Vijil were residents of the 
Navajo Reservation or the State of Utah at the time the as-
sistance was paid. Additionally, it is known that under thtt 
Utah Public Support of Children Act, Title 78, Chapter 45bfi 
of the Utah Code, Utah's right to recover A.F.D.C. payments 
is derivative of the recipients' right to recei\e child 
support. Finally, it is also known that the obligation 
to support one's children does not arise under common law, 
but rather under state statutes imposing a duty of support 
Consequently, only four factual alternatives can 
exist in this case. First, the support obligation under 
which Utah asserts its claim may have arisen under Navajo 
/ / / 
in his Brief (p.16), appellant cited an unamended version of U.C.A. 
78-45b-3(l)(a). The current version is reproduced in the Addendum* 
tribal law, and both appellant and Helen VijiJ may have been 
residents of the Navajo Reservation when the assistance was 
paid. Second, the support obligation may have arisen under 
tribal law, but only the appellant may have been a resident 
of the Reservation. Third, the support obligation may have 
arisen under authority of the state statute, with both 
appellant and Helen Vijil being Reservation residents. 
Fourth, the obligation may have arisen under the state 
statute, but with only appellant being a Reservation resident 
at the time the assistance was paid. 
If the present action arises under either of the 
first two factual alternatives, assertion of jurisdiction 
under Title 78 Chapter 45b, of the Utah Code, requires the 
extension of state civil authority, through application of 
the procedures set out in the Code, to resolution of a dis-
pute involving the Tribal-law support obligation of an 
enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe, domiciled on the Navajo 
Reservation. If instead Utah's claim arises under the third 
and fourth factual alternatives, then this action implicates 
the extension of the state's civil authority through applica-
tion of the procedures of Title 78, Chapter 45b, and also 
^ n ^ n l t r p p i n r»v f- nn <z -{ n-n o f r " f ^ ^ 1 n t i f b n r l f v hv -frnpnq'fnc* U f r i h . ' ^ 
Therefore, no set of facts exists in this case 
which does not involve an impermissible extension of Utah's 
civil authority over the Navajo Reservation. The only 
factual alternatives upon which the claim could be based 
require the extension of Utah's civil authority either by 
imposing its support obligation statute on an enrolled 
member of the Navajo Tribe domiciled on his Reservation, or 
by imposing its statutory support-arrearages recovery 
procedure on an enrolled member of the Tribe, domiciled on 
the Reservation, where the support obligation arises under 
Tribal law. Any such extension of Utah's civil authority 
is preempted under well-established principles of federal 
law* 
b. The State of Utah's assertion of 
jurisdiction over the present action 
infringes upon the sovereignty of 
the Navajo Tribe. 
As appellant stated in his Brief, a finding of 
preemption closes out the necessity for further analysis, 
and requires that ruling of the District Court be reversed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on this ground 
alone. The generalized considerations of sovereignty 
Infringement raised by the respondent, which in any event 
illustrating the rationale for finding an absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction in the District Court over this action, 
and respondents arguments in this regard will be answered. 
Respondent contends that two New Mexico cases, 
Natewa v. Natewa (supra), 499 P.2d 691 and State Securities, 
Inc. v. Anderson (supra), 506 P.2d 786, establish a principle 
that only limited areas of subject matter are exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of tribal courts, and an action to 
collect child support arrearages is not one of these areas of 
exclusive tribal jurisdiction. Consequently, because there 
are matters involving Indians where a state may exercise 
jurisdiction without infringement upon tribal sovereignty, 
the present action must be one of these. 
In Natewa v. Natewa (1972), 499 P.2d 691, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court was presented with a URESA action brought 
by a spouse living in Wisconsin against an enrolled member of 
the Zuni Tribe domiciled on his reservation, where the mar-
riage had been contracted outside the Zuni Reservation. The 
defendant appeared twice in the New Mexico court before 
moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court upheld the excercise of jurisdiction as not in-
fringing upon tribal sovereignty, without explaining the 
made a general appearance prior to making his motion to 
dismiss* Ibid . It is also notable that the Court saw no 
potential for infringement of tribal sovereignty pursuant 
to its acknowledgement that the Tribal member's support 
duty arose under the laws of New Mexico. 
In State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson (1973), 
N.M., 506 P.2d 786, the New Mexico court examined a suit 
to recover overdue notes on an obligation incurred by 
Indians outside their reservation,with the action having 
been initiated by service of process within the reservation 
borders. The Court noted the infringement analysis of 
Williams v. Lee, but rejected a contention that service of 
process caused such infringement. According to the Court, 
state court and tribal court jurisdiction are concurrent 
unless the matter at issue involves a propriety interest in 
reservation land, is a suit where one Indian sues another 
Indian, or the transaction arises in Indian country. Id., 
at p.789. It appears that because service of process im-
plicates none of these restricted areas, and also because 
the obligation was voluntarily incurred off-reservation, tha 
three-justice majority was unwilling to find infringement • 
T11 <-, ^ - t r ^o^« -» fo -» - r - . r t t m ^ f •{ o f | p ^ f -V»n T T I n r 1 r » m n f f- Vi -f c y n n o o r» -f n rt •"•iff*-
case which could be properly committed to the tribal courts 
under the jurisdictional powers granted to them* jt_d • > at 
pp.791-792. 
The danger of reliance upon Natewa and State 
Securities as the sole guides to infringement analysis is 
that they have been superseded by decisions supporting the 
dissent in State Securities. In Fisher v. District Court 
(suprgQ , 424 U.S. 382, the Supreme Court held that existence 
of a tribal court able to resolve reservation-based disputes 
is an essential element of tribal sovereignty, and to permit 
state courts to assert jurisdiction in a matter properly 
committed to tribal courts would serve to weaken such sover-
eignty. Specifically, the Court noted that allowing such a 
jurisdictional exercise 
"...would subject a dispute arising on 
the reservation among reservation Indians 
to a forum other than the one they have 
established for themselves..*[l]t would 
create a substantial risk of conflicting 
adjudications...and would cause a cor-
responding decline in the authority of 
the Tribal Court." (Emphasis supplied) 
Id. , at pp.387-388. Subsequently, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez (1978), 436 U.S 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed. 106, 
the Court suggested that providing either a state or federal 
of R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority (1983, 
9th Cir.), 719 F.2d 979, in which the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeal declared 
M[a] tribe's interest in self-government 
could be implicated in two ways. First, 
if a state or federal court resolves a 
dispute which was within the province 
of the tribal courts. . . .that court would 
impinge upon the tribe's right to adju-
dicate a controversy arising within it.11 
Id. , at p. 983. 
The more recent state court decisions have recog-
nized this broad policy of preserving tribal sovereignty 
by limiting the ability of state and federal courts to assume 
jurisdiction over matters which may properly be resolved by 
tribal courts. These decisions have dropped the argument, 
used in Natewa v. Natewa and State Securities Inc. v. Andersc 
that tribal court jurisdiction is exclusive in only a narrow 
range of subject areas. 
In Chino v. Chino (supra) , 561 P.2d 476, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court retreated from its view 
"...that absolute jurisdiction is not 
necessarily exclusive jurisdiction. 
This rationale was relied upon by this 
court in State Securities Inc. v. 
Anderson, supra, to extend state juris-
diction, but recent decisions of the 
matter consigned to the tribal courts, noted a set of helpful 
criteria to determine infringement. Infringement was then 
found to exist upon two bases: first, state adjudication of 
an action concerning land within a reservation conflicts with 
the tribe's exclusive civil jurisdiction over that land; 
Second, and more importantly, 
[e]ven though the Mescalero tribal law 
makes no provision for a wrongful entry 
and detainer action, the state may not 
assume jurisdiction without congressional 
or tribal authorization. Indian customs 
and traditions may dictate different 
approaches that that which the state may 
use. For a state to move into areas where 
Indian law and procedure have not achieved 
the degree of certainty of state law and 
procedure would deny Indians the opportuni-
ty of developing their own system. (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Id. , at p.479 
Consequently, sovereignty infringement analysis 
cannot be limited to making an inventory of the narrow range 
of subject areas believed to have been the exclusive province 
of tribal courts in 1973. Since that time the issue has been 
transformed, and the proper initial inquiry is whether the 
matter is one over which the tribal courts can properly 
exercise jurisdiction. If an affirmative answer is made, 
then state court lurisdiction is barred. Other considerations 
disregard of its judgment. And, in a related question, an 
examination must be made of whether this potential for con-
flict may stifle the use of custom law in the development oi 
the tribal court system. 
Through these recent developments, the majority 
opinion in State Securities Inc. v. Anderson is eviscerated 
and the dissent is vindicated. The sharp curtailment of 
state law incursions also brings the decision of Natewa v. 
Natewa into doubt. It is unlikely that the New Mexico 
courts would now be so carefree in asserting that "...no 
citation is needed to support the moral and social obligation 
of a parent to support his children.1' (499 P.2d at p.693), 
or that all a state court needs to obtain jurisdiction in 
a URESA action is f,...the existence of a duty of support.•• 
under the laws of the responding state." (Ibid») Both 
statements demonstrate an utter lack of regard for the righl 
of tribal authorities to apply their own support obligation 
laws to tribal members, to determine the measure of a suppoi 
obligation for resident tribal members, and to have the 
tribal judicial system adjudicate disputes concerning that 
obligation free of conflict with the state courts. Natewa 
should probably be limited to its facts, with an emphasis 
are some areas where state jurisdiction is allowed, and 
that this case represents one of those areas. Instead, this 
Court must squarely face the issues presented by recent 
decisions dealing with sovereignty infringement. 
In general, as was seen in Section la, this action 
could have arisen under only four alternative factual settings. 
The resolution of this action under those settings requires 
either that a tribal support obligation be resolved under 
Utah procedural law, or that an enrolled resident member of 
the Navajo Tribe will have imposed upon him a support obli-
gation derived from Utah statutory authority. Both of these 
alternatives infringe upon the right of Navajos to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them, either by making resolution of 
a Tribal support obligation subject to potentially conflicting, 
foreign procedural rules, or by undermining the authority of 
the Tribe to determine the parameters of child support obli-
gations generally applicable to its resident members. 
More specifically, the Court must consider that 
the Navajo Tribe has created a court system which has juris-
diction over the present action to collect child support 
arrearages, and has further established procedures for en-
forr^ncr qurli Hp11nnupnt obligation6*. (See. Appellant'^ Brief, 
Court undermines the authority of the Navajo Tribal courts 
and infringes upon Navajo sovereignty. 
This court must also consider that, as an enrolled 
resident member of the Navajo Tribe, appellant could apply 
to the Navajo Courts for a modification of his support 
obligation. The potential for such action raises the 
spectre of conflicting adjudications between the Utah courts 
and the Navajo courts over the nature and amount of appellant 
support obligation, with the probable consequence that the 
Navajo Court judgment will be disregarded in an action under 
Title 78, Chapter 45b of the Utah Code. For this reason, 
once appropriate jurisdiction is found in the Navajo Court, 
this fact must exclude the Utah courts from acquiring con-
flicting jurisdiction. 
And equally important is the effect that such 
conflict may have on the development of tribal law. 
In a recent decision of the Navajo Courts, the effect of 
traditional law on issues surrounding dissolution of 
marriage was examined. 
"By Navajo tradition, at the time of 
marriage the husband will normally move 
in with the wife's clan. Traditionally 
the father and the children live with 
the mother's family, and children are said 
the wife and children go to her mother's 
unit and the husband remains. I^ci. at 76. 
As to dividing property, the couple keep 
what was theirs before marriage and the 
wife keeps the remainder. One researcher 
summed up the procedure this way: 
MAmong the people who follow the 
old laws, the divorce procedure is 
very simple; the man merely states 
as he walks out of the hogan: "Tse-
hah-maz (Stone Rolls Out.") He takes 
with him all the goods that were his 
before marriage. Any property accumu-
lated during the union remains with 
his wife." Van Valkenburgh, "Navajo 
Common Law 1," 9 Museum Notes 17, 22 
(1936). 
[ ][Par.] There was a principle in finality 
in Navajo customary divorce, and the princi-
ple of restoring harmony in the community by 
quickly and finally breaking ties so the com-
munity can soon return to normal is one which 
is common-sense. To permit a former spouse 
to keep such ties that she or he may be siad 
[sic] to be lurking behind the hogan waiting 
to take a portion of the corn harvest is 
unthinkable, since each spouse returns to his 
or her own family after the divorce. Each 
former spouse should return home after making 
the break and disturb and [sic] other no more. 
Apache v. Republic National Life Insurance Company (1982), 
3 Navajo Reporter 250, 252-254. See, Locke, Book of the 
Navajo, Mankind Publishing (1979), p.17 ["A woman...owns 
the children, which belong to her clan...."]. 
Under traditional law the wife's ownership of the 
Tom Tso, has stated that he would give favorable considera-
tion to arguments made under this traditional rule to with-
draw a child support obligation altogether under appropriate 
circumstances. 
Consequently, if this action were brought in tribal, 
court, Appellant might be able to raise defenses under Navajoj 
customary law unavailable in the state forum. And because an, 
enrolled resident member of the Navajo Tribe cannot raise 
these defenses as a result of the imposition of state court 
jurisdiction, as noted in Chino v. Chino, the Navajo tribe 
is denied the right to develop its own judicial system cover-! 
ing the actions of its resident members according to the 
different approaches which Navajo customs and traditions 
may dictate. Thus, the District Court's assertion of juris-
diction undermines the authority of the Navajo judiciary 
and infringes upon the right of the Navajo to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them. 
In summary, respondent's argument concerning a 
lack of sovereignty infringement in this case do not square-
ly meet the issues raised by recent decisions on this subject 
Infringement exists in this case on any of three grounds. 
First, under the general rule, once jurisdiction over nn 
may exercise jurisdiction and produce a judgment in conflict 
with that of the District Court, Tribal court authority is 
undermined, and Navajo sovereignty is diminished. Third, 
such conflict impedes the ability of the Navajo tribal courts 
to develop their own law on the subject of child support, based 
on custom or tribal common law, by imposing foreign child sup-
port law and procedures on a resident, enrolled member of the 
Tribe* The cumulative effect is to diminish the importance 
of tribal courts in resolving tribal matter^, thereby al86 
diminishing tribal sovereignty. 
c. The "substantial contacts1' exception 
to the preemption of state civil authority 
is not properly applied to this action. 
As was noted in the Appellant's Brief (pp.24-25), 
some state courts have developed an exception to the pre-
emption rule of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission 
(supra), 411 U.S. 164. Based on an analysis of the Montana 
cases which are the chief source of the exception, it appears 
to have three distinct steps. First, under the McClanahan 
rule, a state is preempted from extending its civil authority 
over reservation affairs by an assertion of jurisdiction in 
the case at hand. Second, if the state is eventually allowed 
f-o nc?qprf- 1 ii r-f qd-f r f-f r»r» u n d n r f-TiP p ^ r p p t-f o n , th-fq art" mtiqf 
contacts standards which due process requires. 
Respondent has not grasped this sequence, as 
respondent's brief seems to assert that so long as substan-
tial contact is found within Utah, the requirements of this 
exception are met. Respondent also claims, without analysis, 
that the fact of appellant's children receiving A.F.D.C 
payments in Utah is a substantial contact between appellant 
and Utah sufficient to meet the due process standard which 
the exception requires. 
In applying the exception to this case, the pre-
emption of Utah from asserting subject matter jurisdiction 
in this action has been amply developed in Section la of 
this Reply. The first step of the exception is met. But 
it has also been explained that assertion of jurisdiction 
in this case infringes upon the sovereignty of the Navajo 
Tribe. Therefore, the exception fails on its second require-
ment and cannot be used to grant jurisdiction to the District 
Court in this case. Respondent has apparently missed this 
point, as it confines its discussion to the existence of 
substantial contacts. 
To answer respondent on the point of substantial 
rnnf^rfq. nnnpl1nnf nnfpq th n t fbpre are nonp h P r P . Follow-
But this statement does not answer whether there is any 
contact between appellant and Utah, or whether it is signi-
ficant and substantial. 
The known facts giving rise to the claim can be 
divided into three parts: first, the act on non-support by 
appellant while a domiciliary of the Navajo Reservation; 
second, the application of Helen Vijil to the state of Utah 
for payment of A.F.D.C. benefits; third, payment of benefits 
to Helen Vijil for appellant's children. 
The standards for weighing minimum contacts were 
fully developed in Appellant's Brief (pp.27-29), and may 
fairly be summarized as requiring a voluntary act on the par 
of the non-resident defendant by which he purpose-fully aval 
himself of conducting activities in the forum state. The 
unilateral activity of one claiming a relationship with the 
non-resident cannot satisfy this standard. 
Here, the sole activity of appellant is his non-
payment of support while a resident of the Navajo Reservatio 
This act (or non-act) did not occur within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the State of Utah. It is an outgrowth of 
domestic relations or domestic activities which appellant 
has always maintained within the Navaio Reservation. Ap-
said to represent a voluntary activity on the part of the 
appellant in Utah. Therefore, appellant has no significant 
contacts with Utah sufficient to satisfy the interests of 
fair play and substantial justice. 
Nor would appellant have sufficient contact with 
Utah under Utah's own long-arm statute (U.C.A. section 78-
27-24). Reference to the long-arm statute has a practical 
purpose in determining the existence of subject matter juris-
diction in cases involving Indian controversies. 
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Such a conclusion is consistent with the general minimum 
contacts analysis showing that the appellant's activities 
are insufficient to establish substantial contacts with Utah. 
The ffsignificant contacts" exception therefore 
fails on two grounds. First, assertion of jurisdiction by 
the District Court does infringe upon Navajo sovereignty. 
Second, appellant's activities are insufficient to establish 
minimum contacts with Utah either under general principles 
or by reference to the Utah long-arm statute. Jurisdiction 
of the District Court is preempted and the significant 
contacts exception cannot be used to justify an assertion 
of jurisdiction in the face of such preemption. 
II. THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER A NAVAJO RESIDENT 
OF THE NAVAJO RESERVATION WHO HAS 
NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH UTAH. 
Appellant fully agrees with the respondent's 
assertion that the same factors which grant or deny subject 
matter jurisdiction to a state court also determine whether 
personal jurisdiction exists. However, an examination of 
the law and facts of this case show that Utah is preempted 
from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over this action, 
/// 
would infringe upon the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation if 
it did assert subject matter jurisdiction, and that the 
appellant has not had sufficient significant contact with 
Utah to establish either subject matter or personal juris-
diction in the District Court. Therefore, as Utah is pre-
cluded from asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of this action, it is also precluded from asserting juris-
diction over the person of appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
As observed in the opening section of this Reply, 
respondent's argument in support of the District Court's 
exercise of subject matter and personal jurisdiction in 
this action fails on five independent grounds. First, ever 
set of facts under which this action could have arisen 
requires the extension of state civil authority by imposing 
Utah's statutory support obligation on a reservation domici 
Navajo, or by subjecting a reservation-based support obli-
gation to the statutory resolution procedures of U.C.A. 
78-45b, or by both. Utah is preempted from extending its 
civil authority over the Navajo Reservation in these ways. 
Second, sovereignty infringement analysis has 
been transformed since the days when a state court could 
list a narrow range of subject areas consigned to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribal court and claim con-
current jurisdiction (and absence of infringement). Recent 
/ / / -24-
cases propose that when a tribal court can properly exercise 
jurisdiction over a matter, that jurisdiction is exclusive, 
and any attempted concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the 
state court is barred. This policy seeks to avoid diminish-
ing the authority of the tribal court by subjecting disputes 
to conflicting adjudications, or by inhibiting the tribal 
court from developing its own system for dealing with disputes 
based upon the unique features of its customs or common law. 
Third, in the present case the Navajo Tribal 
courts could appropriately exercise jurisdiction over this 
action. Appellant could also seek a modification of his sup-
port duty in the Tribal Court which would be in conflict with 
the obligation imposed on him by Utah law under 78-45b. The 
nature of this modification could even lead to the total 
dissolution of his support obligation under Navajo custom 
law. But this defense, and its development, is stifled by 
Utah's assertion of jurisdiction over this matter. In 
general, the present action infringes upon Navajo Tribal 
sovereignty either by imposing Utah's statutory support 
obligation upon a resident member of the Tribe, or by 
requiring resolution of a Tribal support obligation through 
Utah's statutory procedural system. Either circumstance 
intrudes upon the Tribe's right to make their own rules 
in these areas. For each of these reasons, the District 
Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this action infringes 
upon Tribal sovereignty. 
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Fourth, the "substantial contacts" exception to 
state preemption of civil authority in Indian controversies 
is based upon a tripartite test, having as its parts: pre-
emption; lack of infringement; substantial contacts. Pre-
emption is found here. However, the District Court's 
jurisdictional assertion infringes on Navajo sovereignty. 
Therefore, the test is inapplicable to the present case on 
this basis alone* 
Fifth, appellant has no significant contacts 
with Utah sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of 
due process. Mere physical presence is not a sufficient 
in-state contact for an Indian domiciled upon his reservatlo 
in the state. Appellant's sole act in this matter was the 
ion-payment of support while a domiciliary of the Navajo 
Reservation. Application for, and receipt of, AFDC benefits 
tfere merely the unilateral acts of one claiming a relation-
ship to appellant, and represent no voluntary act on the par 
of appellant. Additionally, under Utah's long-arm statute, 
appellant has done no act sufficient to place him within 
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. 
Finally, appellant notes his agreement with 
respondent over respondent's statement that personal juris-
diction lives or dies upon the same factors as subject 
matter jurisdiction. Therefore, because the District Court 
could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this 
action, neither did it have jurisdiction over the person 
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appellant• 
It therefore follows from the foregoing that the 
judgment in this action must be vacated, and the writ of 
garnishment it supports must be quashed. 
Date : t^S^VUj^uy ('r'i*^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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78-45b-3. Applicant's right to support from other party assigned to depart-
nent — Enforcement (1) [a] As a condition of eligibility for assistance, an applit 
ant for or recipient of assistance is considered to have assigned to the state all 
ights to support from any other person which have accrued at the time the assign-
nent is executed or (if none is executed) at the time of application for assistance, 
md which the applicant or recipient may have in his or her own behalf or in behalf 
f anjr other family member for whom the applicant or recipient ]s applying for 
r receiving assistance. Any right to support which an applicant or recipient of 
ublic assistance has or claims, passes to the state under the assignment, jy* Jy 
peration of law upon receipt of assistance by the recipient even if the recipient 
oes not execute an assignment, tn the event that If assistance is furnished by 
tie department orTn instances where if the department has contracted to collect 
upport, the department shall become trustee of any cause of action or claims of 
le obligee or any minor child in that obligee's custody, to recover support due 
that obligee from any person and may bring and maintain the action either in 
j own name or in the name of the obligee. 
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No. A-CV-02-80 
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION 
June 11. 1982 
Paulette ARVISO, Appellant, 
v s . 
Rodger DAHOZY, Appellee, 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Appeal heard June 11. 1982 before Acting Chief Justice Marie F. Neswood 
and Associate Justices Robert Walters and Homer Bluehouse. 
Appeal from Window Rock District Court, Hon. Harry Brown presiding. 
Leonard Watchman, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for 
appellant and William P. Battles, Esq., Battles & Associates, Fort Defiance, 
Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellee. 
Remanded. 
This is an appeal by means of a trial de novo from an order 
entered in the District Court at Window Rock on January 3, 1980. 
This court has jurisdiction over the parties because they are 
enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe and they reside within the exterior 
boundaries of the Navajo Nation. The court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the case - the marriage, children and property of the 
marriage - because the action for divorce arose within the territorial 
jurisdiction under the laws of the Navajo Nation (Tit. 9, Ch. 5, Navajo 
Tribal Code). Therefore this court has sole jurisdiction over the 
matter. See Mangold, "Powers of Indian Tribes," 55 Interior Decisions 
14, 40-41(1934) (Interior Dept. Solicitor Opinion). 
The issues in dispute here are ones of fact and not law, to be 
resolved by the new trial held before the Court of Appeals. The 
question presented is this: On September 2, 1977 the trial court 
entered a default judgment providing for child support of $200 per 
month for a minor child. Custody of the child was given to the plaintiff 
mother, Paulette Dahozy. The child support matter came back to court 
because of a complaint Mr. Dahozy had not made the ordered child 
support payments, and on October 5, 1978 the court entered an order 
approving a stipulation of the parties. This court finds the stipulation 
was that Mr. Dahozy would pay the sum of $125 per month on the 
arrearage and for child support until June of 1987, when the $200 per 
month payment would resume. Further problems with nonpayment lead 
to a judgment and order dated July 19, 1979 in which the court did not 
fix an arrearage but ordered the defendant to pay $1,550 in past child 
support with H to be paid within 30 days and the other h to be paid 
within 60 days. Provision was made for a five-day grace period and 
late charges of $2 per day. The child support went back to $200 per 
month, and the defendant was ordered to arrange for a payroll 
deduction to guarantee the payments. 
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The problem presented to this court comes from an interpretation 
of the stipulation made in October of 1978 and the judgment enteied in 
July of 1979. Very simply put, Mr. Dahozy came before the court on 
December 5, 1979 and said he did not owe any back child support and 
he had complied with the July judgment by giving Mrs. Dahozy a check 
for $1,550. He produced the check in evidence over Mrs. Dahozy's 
objections. Mrs. Dahozy argues that the $1,550 check was not made to 
comply with the court's older but it was one-half of a stipulated 
arrearage of $3,100. 
The intention of the patties as to their stipulation was not 
clearly set forth in documents submitted to the court, as it should have 
been, and the resolution of this case is based upon another party to 
the stipulation negotiations, the Honorable Nelson J. McCabe, the trial 
judge sitting on July 18, 1979. 
Judge McCabe was called before the Court of Appeals by sub-
poena, and he testified Mrs. Dahozy's position and recollection are 
correct. 
Therefore it is the unanimous finding of the Court of Appeals 
that the $1,550 paid represents one-half of a prior arrearage of $3,100 
and the other $1,550 is due and owing. 
The question now is what a proper order of the Court of Appeals 
would be. This court declines to sit as a three-judge divorce court. 
The proper role of a court of appeals is to coriect manifest errors in the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law of a trial court. Our juris-
diction is generally confined to appeals, remedying acts of a ttial court 
beyond its jurisdiction and requiring trial court action whete it 
unlawfully fails or refuses to act within its jurisdiction. 7 NTC Sees. 
302, 303. Therefore we will not resolve the factual questions of other 
child support arrearages due, late charges due or other matters. 
As to the question of late charges, this court notes a great deal 
of time has passed since October of 1978 and it observes the fact the 
amount of late charges could amount to a rather Jarge sum. The 
primary party to be considered in this case is the child, and ptoviding 
for her support is the goal. The focus should be on the interests of 
the child and not upon penalizing the defendant for his failuie to 
support his own child. While nonsupporting parents should be 
penalized and punished for the failute to live up to their moral and 
legal duties, such penalties and punishments should not further hamper 
doing what must be done - supporting the child. Therefore the trial 
court should consider the matter of the late charges using its equity 
powers of fairness and seeing the object of the case is served. The 
trial court should consider the income, property and other resources of 
the defendant in assessing late charges. The primary goal of the court 
should be to see that child support arrearages aie eliminated as quickly 
as possible. With regard to the method of taking care of the 
arrearage, the trial court order that the defendant make arrangements 
for payroll deductions was wise and fair. Therefore the trial court 
should make arrangements in any final order for such deductions 
directly. 
There is one final point to be made about this appeal. The 
problem which caused this case came from imprecision in drafting 
documents submitted to the court. While the October, 1978 order 
clearly sets forth an arrearage, there is confusion in how much was to 
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go to the arrearage and how much was to be applied to current child 
support. The July 19, 1979 otder does not set foith the arrearage. All 
orders such as those should state: 
1. The amount of total arrearage; 
2. The period of the arrearage (I.e. what months were not 
paid); 
3. The amount to be paid in Installments on the arrearage (if 
that method applies); 
4. The amount of continuing monthly child suppoit; 
5. The method of payment on arrearage; 
6. The date any payments are to commence; and 
7. Other pertinent orders, making certain all the agreements 
of the parties are in writing. 
Otherwise a party should not be permitted to attack matters left 
out of a stipulation or order, except In cases of fraud, misrepresentation 
or like matters of equity. 
Theiefore it is heieby 
ORDERS that this matter is remanded to the Disttict Coutt of 
the Navajo Nation at Window Rock for fuither ptoceedings in accoi dance 
with this opinion. The plaintiff shall be granted her costs on appeal. 
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No. A-CV-29-81 
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION 
September 16, 1982 
Benjamin LEE, Appellant. 
vs . 
Mary Lynn FOSTER, Appellee. 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
Review of appeal by Chief Justice Nelson J. McCabe. 
Appeal from Window Rock District Court, the Honorable Tom Tso presi-
ding. 
William P. Battles, Esq., Battles ft Associates, Fort Defiance, Navajo 
Nation (Arizona) for Appellant and William Shepherd, Esq., DNA, 
Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellee. 
Appeal dismissed. 
This is an appeal from an order of the Window Rock Dlstiict 
Court which fixed an arrearage figure for child support which was 
found to be due and owing, and confirmed a prior child support monthly 
payment order. 
The reasons for appeal assigned in a brief before the coutt 
complain: 1. There was an oral continuance granted by a judge other 
than the regular judge for the judicial district, but the regular judge 
for the district proceeded with a hearing; 2. The court did not have 
sufficient testimony upon which to base its order; 3. Theie was no 
accounting to the court regarding the condition and well being of the 
minor child; and 4. The court ignored blood grouping motions. 
The question to be decided here is whether the reasons shown 
for the appeal are enough to show "good cause" for the purpose of the 
statute allowing appeals for good cause. 
*• The continuance: Judge Brown apparently granted an oral 
continuance and Judge Tso, the regular district judge, found Judge 
Brown had no jurisdiction to grant a continuance. Further, the appel-
lant was present at the arrearage hearing and refused to provide infor-
mation to the court when asked to speak. 
This ground is not enough to show "good cause" because this 
court takes judicial notice that Judge Tso is the regular sitting judge in 
the Window Rock District. There are no affidavits or other matters in 
the record to overcome the presumption that only Judge Tso was 
authorized to grant a continuance. Further, the appellant was present 
at the hearing and had the opportunity to bring up continuance, but 
apparently did not do so. He also had the opportunity to answer very 
simple fact question, "Sir, did you pay the monthly child support which 
this court ordered or did you not?" The appellant was not prejudiced 
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by the action of the curt, and any error arising out of the continuance 
matter was quite apparently hatmless. 
2. Testimony to support the order: The proceeding before the 
District Court was simple. On December 3, 1979 the appellant was 
found to be the father of a child, and the court ordered that the 
appellant pay $150 per month for the support of the child. The mother 
of the child later came before the court by means of a petition for an 
order to show cause to compel the appellant to pay accrued child support 
The only questions the court had to decide were whether the appellant 
had obeyed the prior order, and, if money was owing, how much. The 
court's findings clearly show an arrearage for the period between the 
judgment and April of 1981, and that $2,500 was due and owing. The 
testimony of the mother would sound something like this: "Since the 
court ordered Mr. Lee to pay $150 per month for the support of his 
child in December of 1979, he has paid me nothing." 
The trial court's findings are clearly based upon sufficient 
testimony. 
3' Accounting for the condition and well being of the child: 
This is about as frivolous an argument as has ever been presented to 
this court. The legal issue raised by the pleadings before the court 
was whether or not the appellant had obeyed the court by paying child 
support. The appellant cites utterly no authority for the proposition 
that any court has any obligation to make an inquiry about the child in 
a proceeding such as this. Of course he would be unable to find any. 
Fathers who owe child support often attempt to raise smokescreens by 
way of hypocritical concern for the child or a false demand for child 
custody, and the Courts of the Navajo Nation should never tolerate 
such conduct. 
4* The blood grouping motions: This is another smokescreen 
raised by the appellant. The issue before the court was not paternity. 
That issue was decided in December of 1979. The appellant's brief goes 
on at length about the concept of res adjudicata, and certainly that 
idea is applicable to this case. Res adjudicata forecloses any question 
of blood grouping tests with respect to the environment of an ajudicated 
and binding paternity judgment. 
This review of the appeal before the court shows that the appel-
lant has raised no matters of record which support his contentions 
regarding the continuance and certainly nothing has been shown which 
overcomes the presumption that Judge Brown had no authority to act. 
The remaining arguments which were generally raised but not supported, 
are frivolous and an affront to this court. 
Therefore this appeal is DISMISSED. 
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WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT 
September 16, 1982 
No. WR-CV-197-82 
OPINION AND ORDER 
FAYE APACHE, and JUDY GLANZER, 
Administratrix for the 
ESTATE OF BOYD APACHE, Plaintiffs, v. 
REPUBLIC NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
and REBECCA JANE APACHE, Defendants. 
Honorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding. 
It often happesn that cases which pose a simple legal question to 
be answered by the court are not as simple as they seem. This Is one 
of those cases. 
The situation itself is rather simple. Boyd Apache and Rebecca 
Jane Jim were married on July 2, 1977 in Phoenix, Arizona, and at one 
point Mr. Apache named his wife as the beneficiary to his group life 
insurance policy with the Republic National Life Insurance Company. 
The policy is one which the employees of the Navajo Nation have as a 
part of their employment, and as it was with most tribal employees, Mr. 
Apache designated his wife as the beneficiary of the policy. 
The couple separated, and in October of 1981 the wife obtaind a 
default divorce. One probem with default divorces is that spouses who 
are anxious to sever their ties with each other are often negligent 
about making arrangements for all their property interests in a divorce 
decree. That was the situation here, and neither Mr. or Mrs. Apache 
thought to settle who the beneficiary to the insurance policy would be. 
Mr. Apache did not think of changing the beneficiary to his group life 
policy, and he died in an auto crash about a month after the divorce 
without doing so. 
The dispute here is between the former spouse, who is named as 
the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, and the mother and sister of 
the decedent. This court has already ruled that the former wife lost 
any interest in the insurance proceeds because of the divorce, and she 
now asks the court to reconsider that ruling. 
All the parties ask the simple legal question: "Does a spouse 
named as an insurance beneficiary lose the right to insurance due to a 
divorce?" 
The former wife urges the court to say "no," relying upon 
Arizona law and the principle that insurance policies are contract matters 
in which the terms of the contract must be enforced. 
The mother and sister-administratrix say "yes," urging the court 
to find an insurable interest had been terminated and to find that 
under Navajo customary law a divorce severs all rights of the former 
spouse. 
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The parties have presented several legal issues in their briefs 
(and very well), and the court finds a procedural barrier it must pass 
over before reaching the reasoning required to answer the question 
posed. The legal battier is that of whether or not the court is re-
quired to apply apparently dispositive Arizona state law. Then the 
legal alternatives which appear to be available are: 
1. Applying the flat rule of Arizona that the policy designation 
is valid; 
2. Finding there is no insurable interest such as to make the 
beneficiary designation valid; 
3. Finding a termination of the interest of the former wife in 
the policy; or 
4. Declaring a Navajo customary law which terminates a former 
spouse's interest;. 
THE CHOICE OF LAW IN THIS CASE 
The decendent was a resident of the Arizona portion of the 
Navajo Nation, and the former spouse says that the court is required to 
apply Arizona law which is favorable to the position she takes. This 
court is required to apply any federal law or Navajo laws or customs of 
the Navajo Nation which may be applicable to a particular civil action. 
7 NTC Sec. 204(a). If the court finds there are no applicable Navajo 
statutory or customary laws or if it finds there is no applicable federal 
law, then it must apply the law of the state where the dispute arises. 7 
NTC Sec. 204(c). Therefore the choice of law question is resolved if 
there is an£ applicable Navajo or federal law. The court finds that 
there is no applicable federal law or Navajo statutory law with regard to 
the legal question here, but that there is Navajo customary law which 
may be applied. 
NAVAJO CUSTOMARY LAW 
Paragraph IV of the mother and sister's petition for an injunc-
tion raises the legal question of custom in this way: 
"That by Navajo tradition, Rebecca Apache upon 
divorce to Boyd Apache relinquished all rights and 
title to his property, and upon the final decree of 
divorce as a single unmarried person having no claim 
or right to the estate or insurance of Boyd Apache." 
This allegation adequately and properly put the opposing parties on 
notice that Navajo custom would be relied upon as applicable law. The 
former spouse complains that at the time of the final hearing in this 
case there was no evidence on what the custom is, although theie was 
argument about it. She also says that there was no advice by "coun-
sellors familiar with . . . customs and usages," as provided for by 7 
NTC Sec. 204(b). 
It is only where there is a doubt regarding the custom or 
usuage that the court need avail itself of experts in Navajo culture, 
and the statute permits the court to take judicial notice of Navajo 
traditional law. It is clear that a judge not only may, but must take 
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judicial notice of local law. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evi-
dence, Sec. 335 (2nd. Ed. 1972J. If one argues Ifiat custom ancf 
tradition are matters of factual evidence and not reading the law as it 
is printed, it is clear that this court can take judicial notice of customs 
as adjudicative facts. R. 5, Rules of Evidence. Thus, if the custom is 
generally known within the community, or it can be found by resort to 
accurate sources, it is proven. In the Navajo context, the comment by 
a dean of one law shcool that "Judicial notice may only be taken of 
those facts every damn fool knows" is appropriate. McCormick, supra, 
p. 761, f.25. 
Whether or not Navajo custom will decide this case depends upon 
whether the court can take judicial notice of Navajo marriage and divorce 
customs "every damn fool knows." 
By Navajo tradition, at the time of marriage the husband will 
normally move in with the wife's clan. Traditionally the father and any 
children live with the mother's family, and children are said to "belong" 
to the mother's clan. Kluckhon and Leighton, The Navaho, 100 (Rev. 
Ed. 1974). When there is a divorce and the coup!e~is living with the 
wife's family, the husband simply returns to his own mother's unit. 
Witherspoon, Navaho Kinship and Marriage, 75 (1975). If the divorce 
takes place at the residence area of the husband, then the wife and 
children go to her mother's unit and the husband remains. Id. at 76. 
As to dividing property, the couple keep what was theirs before marri-
age and the wife keeps the remainder. One researcher summed up the 
procedure this way: 
"Among the people who follow the old laws, the 
divorce procedure is very simple; the man merely 
states as he walks out of the hogan: "Tse-hah-maz 
(Stone Rolls Out.") He takes with him all the goods 
that were his before marriage. Any property accumu-
lated during the union remains with his wife." Van 
Valkenburgh, "Navajo Common Law 1," 9 Museum Notes 
17, 22 (1936). 
Another method of divorce was counselling by the wife's father and, 
when it appeared there could be no reconciliation, the couple would 
"split the blanket," dividing equally the goods they acquired during the 
marriage. Therefore it would appear that in the absence of an agree-
ment, the wife would take all. 
Navajo customs cannot be applied in a vacuum, and they must be 
applied with logic in accordance with present circumstances. It is not 
correct to say that Navajo custom cannot be applied to situations such 
as this, where there are contracts binding commercial entities from the 
outside that don't understand local situations. That is nonsense, 
because Navajo custom and tradition i as much the law of the Navajo 
Nation as a tribal council resolution or a statute in the Nava(o^ Tribal 
Code. Contracts of insurance are made subject to the" local law of 
contract or insurance, and that local law determines the validity and 
construction of the contract. 43 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance Sec. 29. 
Applying these principles of Navajo custom, we can find that 
there is a custom of finally terminating a marriage by someone moving, 
the woman keeping the property when the move is made or the couple 
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making an equal division of marital property before going their own 
ways. The principle of finality requires that the court say there is an 
event which cuts the tics of the parties, and the event here is the 
divorce. 
Under Navajo custom the woman can simply keep the property of 
the marriage and send the man to his own family, taking only his own 
property acquired before the marriage. She also has the option of 
working out an arrangement with the man. In modern times, the, woman 
has the further choice of coming into a court using Anglo-European 
ways, and that is what happened here. The woman left the man and fileo*. 
a divorce acting against him. Importantly, she had the option of deman-
ding a property settlement but the decree only provides for child sup-
port. She therefore left the decedent with his remaining property. 
The life insurance policy Navajo tribal employees have is not 
whole life insurance in which a cash value builds - it is an ordinary life 
policy which provides coverage only so long as the premiums are paid. 
Ownership rights to the proceeds of the policy are not absolute and can 
change at the will of the policyholder. See Harris v. Harris, 493 P.2d 
407, 408 (N.M. 1972). Therefore the former wIfe~Kas no right to the 
policy proceeds as such. Because Navajo customs show us that there 
was finality to custom divorces (forbidden here since 1940; 9 NTC Sec. 
407) and since the former wife left the husband, leaving property 
behind her, this court must hold that as a matter of Navajo customary 
law she surrendered any further right in the policy. 
It has been said that in additon to the fact of divorce a former 
wife may lose her interest as a beneficiary under an insurance policy 
by an agreement of the parties which can be construed as a relinquish-
ment of the spouse's rights to the insurance. 44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance 
Sec. 1740. For the purpose of Navajo customary law this court must 
hold that leaving a spouse is just such a relinquishment of rights. If 
the woman has no further interest in the man, then she should have no 
interest in his life. "(T)he belief that the beneificary of life insurance 
should have an interest in the insured's continued life, is very ancient 
and still persists." New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 
F.2d 665, 667 (2nd Cir. 1939). It Is common "principle of"law that the 
agreement of the parties can be construed by their actions. Here there 
was a desertion and a divorce in which no property was claimed, 
leaving the clear inference the former wife was satisfied with the pro-
perty division. This conduct is, of itself, sufficient to show her agree-
ment that she would give up any future rights to the former husband's 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
The general American legal principle appears to be that a former 
wife named as a beneficiary in an Insurance policy is entitled to its 
proceeds. There was formerly a Texas rule that the woman lost an 
insurable interest in the man's life ( i .e . a valid interest in there being 
insurance on him to which she is the beneficiary) upon divorce. This 
court of course does not rely upon insurance law but upon the clear 
effect of divorce by Navajo custom in holding contrary to the general 
American rule. This is perfectly proper and not offensive to any sense 
of Anglo-European justice. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., above, p. 
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667. There was a principle of finatlty in Navajo customary divorce, and 
the principle of restoring hatmony in the community by quickly and 
finally breaking ties so the community can soon return to normal is one 
which is common-sense. To permit a former spouse to keep such ties 
that she or he may be siad to be lurking behind the hogan waiting to 
take a portion of the corn harvest is unthinkable, since each spouse 
returns to his or her own family after the divorce. Each fotmer spouse 
should return home after making the break and disturb and other no 
more. 
Therefore the motion to reconsider the judgment of July 13, 1982 
is hereby DENIED. 
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